Learning lessons from Iraq

[CivMil]

We (US & coalition forces) need to learn from our failure in Iraq. There's no doubt we've failed. Our objective was a friendly, democratic regime that would provide military bases, transform Middle Eastern politics & reduce support for anti-Israeli terrorism. Fat chance.

Given this objective, mistakes were made at every level -- political, strategic, operational & tactical. All the mistakes had a common root, as follows.

Achieving the objective meant interacting with other parties, at every level, politically as well as militarily, so as to change their political & military objectives. It couldn't be achieved, as assumed, by unilateral US military action.

In other words, we just need to learn the doctrine that drama theorists, along with General Sir Rupert Smith, have been trying to put across for years.

Specific mistakes at each level were as follows.

-- We shouldn't have taken on Iraq without first finishing the job in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, success in Afghanistan requires negotiating with neighbouring countries and with power brokers in the country itself.

-- Before taking on Iraq, we should have got the backing of Middle Eastern states, as the first Bush president did before attacking in 1991. Their price might have been US pressure on Israel for significant progress toward a Palestinian settlement. A price worth paying.

-- After defeating Saddam's forces, we should have negotiated a political settlement for Iraq involving Iraqi Sunnis, Shias & Kurds & supported by neighbouring states, including Iran & Syria. This would have been easy then, when all were highly impressed by US military might. Now it will be much harder.

-- We should have made a deal with Saddam's army & police to keep order while the new, agreed regime was installed.

-- Our troops should have had the training & organizational systems to support effective peace-keeping/nation-building/stabilization/reconstruction/counter-insurgency operations. The name for this kind of operation keeps changing as the military try to get their minds round it. Rupert Smith's book calls it "war amongst the people". In Vietnam it was called "winning hearts & minds". Basically, it's applied drama theory. It means that commanders at every level, right down to platoon sergeant & individual soldier, have to have political objectives given to them along with the tools for pursuing them as they interact with civilian agencies, tribal leaders & members, militia leaders & members, etc.

Is it too late? Not if our primary objective is to quash anti-Western, Al-Qaeda-type, Islamist terrorism. All those we must interact with sympathise with this objective. Other objectives - eg, movement toward democracy -- will be harder. Destroying the "Axis of Evil" as now defined is unachievable because Iran is a member of this Axis, & Iran is an essential interlocutor.