Korean Chicken? Shelling of the Island of Yeonpyeong 23 Nov

New analysis using dt.2 as well as remodeling dt.1 cases using dt.2

Korean Chicken? Shelling of the Island of Yeonpyeong 23 Nov

Postby DramaStudent » Thu Nov 25, 2010 1:13 pm

OK, so what's happening here? Why are the North Koreans shelling that Island? (it all looks irrational to me!) What are they hoping to gain by what they are doing? Is it perhaps that the North playing a classic game of "chicken" with the south? Both sides don't want to lose face by backing down, and so carry on escalating using more and more force until we get a war. Can DT2 help us understand what's happening?
DramaStudent
 
Posts: 15
Joined: Sat Oct 30, 2010 9:01 pm

Re: Korean Chicken? Shelling of the Island of Yeonpyeong 23 Nov

Postby MikeYoung » Tue Nov 30, 2010 8:30 am

You are right that there is brinkmanship going on here, but I don't think it's quite the "the classic game of chicken" you hypothesise. For example, in the classic game, neither side can see the action the other is going to play before they make their own move. The moves are simultaneous. I don't think it's like that in Korea. Each side took it in turns to do something more provocative, so we have a constant escalation. The thought that somebody is behaving irrationally is a good clue that you don't really understand their motivations, not that they are genuinely doing random stuff.

In my view that the situation is easily understandable if we look at it using this analysis
The ownership of the islands is not disputed, but the sea around them is (see this Wikipedia picture):
Image
The red border is what the North Koreans claim, and the blue border what the South Koreans claim. The island of Yeonpyeong is at Number1.
So the history of what went on is this:
● The South performs naval exercises (the Hoguk Exercise) inside the disputed area, that is between the red and blue lines in the map above. Note that the South really didn’t need to do this. There are plenty of undisputed seas about for the South to use. By having ships in the disputed area, it is provoking the North. They further proveked the North by firing shells that landed in the disputed area. The shells wore not fired in the direction of North Korea, but away from it. The North felt powerless, it has a persuasion dilemma in that it cannot stop the South (the South can and undoubtedly will block the North's position - the definition of a persuasion dilemma): The. South has no dilemmas because it can unilaterally implement its position, and the North can do nothing about it.
Image
● The North chooses to overcome its dilemma by changing the game. It threatens to introduce a new option "Bombard Yeonpyeong" unless the South removes its naval forces from the disputed zone. The ultimatum was issued at 08:20 AM but unfortunately the South probably doubted that the North would actually do this. So all the north Koreans have done is given themselves a threat dilemma.
Image
● The most obvious way for the North to overcome its Threat Dilemma is to carry it out, thus proving that you can be trusted to do what you say. To back down would be to lose face. The South now has no doubt that the North will bombard the island. (it's doing it!) The North is now flouting the South, so the South has a Persuasion Dilemma with the North over the bombardment.
Image
● The next stage is an escalation by the South. It changes the game (also by introducing a new option) and starts to retaliate by attacking the North's artillery pieces. The aim of this may be to destroy the North's ability to bombard the Island (to change the game by destroying the option). The South hopes that the North will realize this is going to happen and back down.
Image
● The final stage is perhaps the most odd. Both sides agree to a cease fire, removing their persuasion dilemmas about the artillery, but interestingly nothing is said about the cassis belli. We aren't told if the South Korean Navy is still in the disputed zone. Has the South secretly abandoned its insistence in exercising in the disputed waters?
Image
In conclusion, although we may perceive the North is behaving immorally, by over-reacting to its dilemmas, the analysis above shown it is not behaving irrationally, it is not acting at random without a reason. It is reacting to provocation. Thus this analysis can help us to understand, know and predict how other parties will react.
Last edited by MikeYoung on Tue Nov 30, 2010 7:42 pm, edited 3 times in total.
User avatar
MikeYoung
 
Posts: 65
Joined: Tue May 31, 2005 5:48 am
Location: Gillingham (Kent): London

Re: Korean Chicken? Shelling of the Island of Yeonpyeong 23 Nov

Postby DramaStudent » Tue Nov 30, 2010 8:58 am

Why does the North react militarily, couldn't it do something else?
DramaStudent
 
Posts: 15
Joined: Sat Oct 30, 2010 9:01 pm

Re: Korean Chicken? Shelling of the Island of Yeonpyeong 23 Nov

Postby MikeYoung » Tue Nov 30, 2010 4:53 pm

Well, the North is massively inferior to the South in all aspects apart from the military, so the only cards it has are the military suit. What else could it do?
User avatar
MikeYoung
 
Posts: 65
Joined: Tue May 31, 2005 5:48 am
Location: Gillingham (Kent): London

Re: Korean Chicken? Shelling of the Island of Yeonpyeong 23 Nov

Postby DramaStudent » Tue Nov 30, 2010 4:55 pm

So who has "won"?
DramaStudent
 
Posts: 15
Joined: Sat Oct 30, 2010 9:01 pm

Re: Korean Chicken? Shelling of the Island of Yeonpyeong 23 Nov

Postby MikeYoung » Tue Nov 30, 2010 4:58 pm

I honestly don't know. I suppose we could say that if the South Korean Navy is in the disputed area, then it has won, if it isn't then the North has won. There is a lot of naval manoeuvring, and the US has sent a carrier, but crucially nobody has said if they will deploy in the disputed zone. Nobody seems to be publicising where the South Korean navy is now. Perhaps in a part of the world where face is so important, this is a good thing. That's why I have a question mark in the "now" box in Act 5.
User avatar
MikeYoung
 
Posts: 65
Joined: Tue May 31, 2005 5:48 am
Location: Gillingham (Kent): London

Situation at 7th December 2010

Postby MikeYoung » Tue Dec 07, 2010 2:37 pm

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11934402 says that:

"The situation on the peninsula remains highly unstable. South Korea has entered a second day of major live-fire exercises, despite warnings from the North.

The drills avoid the most contentious area, along the disputed western sea border."

So the South is doing live fire excerises, but not in the disputed area, so possibly the North has "won"
Last edited by MikeYoung on Tue Dec 07, 2010 2:40 pm, edited 1 time in total.
User avatar
MikeYoung
 
Posts: 65
Joined: Tue May 31, 2005 5:48 am
Location: Gillingham (Kent): London

Re: Korean Chicken? Shelling of the Island of Yeonpyeong 23 Nov

Postby Manuel » Thu Dec 09, 2010 7:25 pm

Mike,

I have redrawn the confrontation you describe using the standard modelling system, for the benefit of other Drama Theory practitioners.

Here is the point of departure: South Korea begins military exercises in disputed waters, to the North's opposition. This gives the North a persuasion dilemma.

Image

To get rid of its persuasion dilemma, the North threatens to bombard the South, which bears a clear risk of escalation. Since the South does not believe the threat and carries on with the naval exercises, the North has now both a persuasion and a rejection (threat) dilemma:

Image

To get rid of its rejection dilemma, the North decides to implement its threat once, thus giving the South a persuasion dilemma. The North shows it's not afraid of escalation. However, it still faces the initial persuasion dilemma with respect to the South (it wants the naval exercises to stop).

Image

Now the South escalates by bombarding the North, thus bringing closer a potential war situation.

Image

At this point, the South seems to back out. It probably never intended to see the whole situation going this far. Having more to lose from a potential war, it stops the naval exercises and withdraws (notice that if we don't know whether the South Korean navy is in the disputed zone performing the exercises, the message the South is sending is that there are no more naval exercises). All parties get rid of their persuasion and rejection dilemmas and there is a new agreement:

Image

Notice, however, that this is a very unstable agreement. The North will no doubt keep their artillery pointing at South Korea, thus indicating they have a trust dilemma with respect to its southern neighbour.
Manuel
 
Posts: 150
Joined: Thu Jul 28, 2005 11:31 am
Location: Barcelona, Spain


Return to Military using dt.2

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest

cron