Pathologies of impossible trust and impossible cooperation

[Manuel]

The case of Job vs. Yahweh has prompted a general theory of pathologies, which says that

all pathologies arise from trying to eliminate dilemmas by taking meta-positions that cease to refer to the issues at stake. Consequently, resolution of the meta-interaction doesn't satisfactorily resolve the original issues.

I would like to start testing this hypothesis by formulating two new pathologies:

I call the first one the pathology of impossible trust. A party suffering from this pathology is unable to trust another other party, no matter what. This pathological lack of trust makes reaching an agreement an impossible task. One example: When the Allied Forces invaded Italy in 1943, the Savoy King arrested Mussolini and fled Rome with his trusted military commanders to form a government in the Allied-controlled territories. Marshall Badoglio, who had been fighting the allies until then, became head of the government and offered to help the Allies in the war effort. If the Allied had trusted the Savoy-baked government enough, the following agreement could have been reached:



However, the Allied were unable to trust Badoglio and the King, who had backed Mussolini for decades, and preferred to decline the offer. Thus, the actual OB was this one:



In substance, mistrust lead to no agreement. So a pathology of impossible trust happens when a party ceases to try to address its trust dilemma by taking a position that ceases to refer to the issues at stake and so can't make itself trust the other party and reach an agreement:




The second pathology comes from the same perspective and could be called pathology of impossible cooperation. An example could be two countries trying to reach a trade agreement. One of the countries is less developed and demands the other to eliminate trade barriers but let it keep its own. The developed country wants a bilateral elimination of trade barriers:



The developed country, though, has been known for using non-tariff barriers to protect its economy in the past and finds it difficult to convince the developing country that its intentions are actually honest. So instead of trying to resolve its cooperation dilemma, the developed country gives up all attempts to cooperate and no deal is achieved. Not an uncommon situation in international trade talks:



Basically, a pathology of impossible cooperation happens when a party ceases to try to address its cooperation dilemma by taking a position that ceases to refer to the issues at stake, with the result that it can't reach an agreement with another party.



As a conclusion, it seems easy to identify and formulate these two new pathologies following the "general theory of pathologies". I'd say it makes sense to look for characters giving up the issues at stake for meta-positions that lead to no agreement.
Comments?

[Nigel Howard]

I think these are 2 excellent examples of pathology. As you say, they fit into the suggested general theory of pathologies -- ie, they are ways to overcome dilemmas by re-defining a problem in a manner that avoids dealing satsifactorily with the initial issues at stake.

In general, pathologies seem to arise from giving higher priority to dilemma-elimination than to the needs (the settling of issues) that gave rise to the dilemmas that are being eliminated.

Often, as in your examples, the rationale for dilemma-elimination consists of taking as fixed & unalterable certain factors that are, in fact, variable -- ie, that do change under the influence of emotions & rationalizations provoked by dilemmas. In your examples, what is taken as fixed & unchangeable are:

-- (i) In the case of the impossible-trust pathology: the fact that another party is untrustworthy. Untrustworthiness is seen as an unalterable aspect of a party's character, rather than as a response to a particular situation.
-- (ii) In the case of the impossible-cooperation pathology: the fact that another party sees ourself as untrustworthy. This perception is again seen as an unalterable aspect of that party's character, rather than a particular response.

[Nigel Howard]

Manuel, am I right in thinking that the Badoglio government was really asking the Allies to show some kind of acceptance of its support -- either some kind of recognition or, if not, then at least some communication to bring about operational coordination? Otherwise, there would have been no reason for the Badoglio government to give up its position; it would have been independent of the Allies.

This model, I suggest, gives the reason. It shows the Badoglio government's dependence on the Allies.



Likewise, I suggest that the following model shows the actual confrontation better, being a model in which the Allies eliminate all their dilemmas by making no demands on the Badoglio government. The Badoglio government's demands on the Allies give it dilemmas, but give none to Allies.



Note that in this model the option "mistrust the Badoglio government" doesn't appear. I see it as a higher-level, generally-defined option, that determines policy in a whole set of lower-level models. It's therefore necessary, when looking at one of these lower-level models, to look at the exact effect it has at the lower level, rather than indicating it in general terms by means of the higher-level option. The exact effect, I suggest, is to mandate rejection of the option "'accept' Badoglio government".

In general, I believe we can think of any pathology of preemption as being like this. That is, it consists of taking a higher-level decision about a whole set of lower-level interactions, dictating policy for each one without regard to the issues at stake. We can model this higher-level decision. But in order to see its lower-level effect, we need to model it using lower-level options.

Do you see what I mean?

[Manuel]

To clarify the scenario, the Badoglio government was asking the Allies to let them contribute in the war effort, because that would be an implicit, official acknowledgement of its international relevance. That acknowledgement was crucial to the survival of the Savoy Royal House after the war. The Allies had to tolerate the Savoy-backed government lead by Marshall Badoglio because there wasn't any alternative at the time, but they wouldn't go beyond that. Supporting the Allies in the war effort was the only card the Badoglio government could play, and the Allies could simply accept it or reject it. That's why I didn't add the option ""accept Badoglio goverment" for the Allies, because it would be somewhat redundant.

In any case, an option like "mistrust the Badoglio government no matter what" is perhaps not the best way of expressing the Allies' options. I understand what you mean with pathologies acting at the high level, dictating policy in lower-level confrontations, i.e. the positions adopted by the parties in specific scenarios. I agree with what you say.